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Rediscovering the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Power: 
Political and Constitutional Challenges to the Canadian Bankruptcy Act, 1919-1929 
Thomas G. W. Telfer 
[A]ll these questions—that is the rights of the parliament of Canada as against the provincial 
legislature to legislate in matters of bankruptcy--will in due course come before the judicial 
committee of the Privy Council. 
    S.W. Jacobs, House of Commons Debates, 26 March 19231 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The enactment of the Canadian Bankruptcy Act of 19192 created a great deal of 
optimism in the business and legal community. The new statute finally enabled Canada to 
join other civilized nations, like England and the United States, that embraced bankruptcy 
law as a permanent commercial statute.3 The idea of using a federal law to deal with 
debtors and creditors was new to the Canadian legal world in 1919. Although s. 91(21) of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 granted Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over “Bankruptcy 
and Insolvency” the Dominion largely abandoned4 this federal power by repealing the 
                                                 
 Professor, Western University, Faculty of Law. A version of this paper was originally presented at the 
Commercial Law Conference Honouring Professor RCC Cuming, University of Saskatchewan, November 
2016. I am indebted to Anna Lund, Virginia Torrie and Wade Wright who provided comments on an earlier 
draft. Research assistance was provided by Courtney Davis, Meghan Loughry and Oliver Hutchison. 
1 House of Commons Debates, 14th Parl, 2nd Sess, vol II (26 March 1923) at 1519 (Jacobs, George Etienne 
Cartier). 
2 Bankruptcy Act of 1919, SC 1919, c 36. 
3 For examples of optimism in the business community see Review of Lewis Duncan, The Law and 
Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (1922) 34 Jurid Rev 193; “Canada’s Bankruptcy Act”, The Globe (7 
January 1920) 6; “Bankruptcy Act Will Help Business World: New Measure Wipes out Variety of 
Provincial Laws” Financial Post (5 July 1919) 13 at 16; FM Moffat, “Bankruptcy in Canada” Financial 
Post 21 (25 March 1927) 28; “Bankruptcy Act in Force July 1”, The Globe (6 January 1920) 2. 
4 Parliament did not completely abandon the field as it enacted legislation in 1882 to deal with insolvent 
trading companies and banks: Thomas GW Telfer & Bruce L Welling, “The Winding-Up and Restructuring 
Act: Realigning Insolvency’s Orphan to the Modern Law Reform Process” (2008) 24 BFLR 234 at 235. 
 
 3 
Insolvent Act5 in 18806 thereby enabling the provinces to pass debtor creditor legislation.  
In 1919, there was an assumption that the new national bankruptcy law would improve 
upon non-uniform provincial law.7 In the early 1920s, many lawyers believed that the 
federal power was meant to be read broadly such that it would allow the Dominion to 
interfere with provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights to make the 
Bankruptcy Act more workable.8  
From today’s perspective, the legal and business community’s optimism was well 
placed. The Bankruptcy Act of 1919 has become Canada’s founding bankruptcy statute 
and it established a permanent bankruptcy regime. On the constitutional side, if we look 
at the evolution of the bankruptcy and insolvency power over the longer term, from 1919 
“there has been a progressive expansion of the federal presence in the field.”9 However, 
the permanency of the Bankruptcy Act and a broad interpretation of the bankruptcy power 
were not inevitable or predictable outcomes in 1920. Some questioned Parliament’s 
ability to pass legislation that interfered with decades old provincial debtor creditor law.10 
                                                 
5 Insolvent Act of 1875, SC 1875, c 16. 
6 An Act to Repeal the Acts Respecting Insolvency Now in Force in Canada, SC 1880, c 1. For the reasons 
for repeal and the 1919 revival of bankruptcy law see Thomas GW Telfer, Ruin and Redemption: The 
Struggle for a Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 1867-1919 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Osgoode 
Society for Canadian Legal History, 2014). 
7 “Dominion Association of Chartered Accountants: Address on Bankruptcy Act” 65:12 Monetary Times 
(17 September 1920) 5 at 8. See also FM Moffat, “Bankruptcy in Canada” 21 Financial Post (25 March 
1927) 28. One aspect of the new Act was not uniform. Section 25 of the Bankruptcy Act relied upon 
provincial exemption law to determine exempt property in a bankruptcy. See Thomas GW Telfer, “The 
Evolution of Bankruptcy Exemption Law in Canada 1867-1919: The Triumph of the Provincial Model” 
[2007] Ann Rev Insol L 593. 
 
8 See e.g. Lewis Duncan, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1922) at ix. 
9 Roderick Wood, “The Paramountcy Principle in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law: The Latest Word 
(2016) 58 CBLJ 27 at 29. 
10 Perhaps this is not surprising. Peter Hogg and Wade Wright note that the enumerated federal bankruptcy 
and insolvency power was a subject matter that would “otherwise have come within property and civil 
rights” jurisdiction of the provinces. Peter Hogg & Wade Wright, “Canadian Federalism, the Privy Council 
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Indeed, many Quebec legal thinkers did not welcome the new federal statute as they 
believed it to be a threat to the “purity of civil law.”11  
During 1922 and 1923, there were calls from inside and outside Parliament to 
repeal the Bankruptcy Act of 1919. Those seeking repeal sought to preserve provincial 
law from federal interference. This provincial rights’ perspective ultimately surfaced in 
constitutional cases where litigants sought to protect the property and civil rights 
jurisdiction of the provinces from the intrusion of the Bankruptcy Act. In the 1928 case of 
Royal Bank v. Larue12 the Privy Council ended the debate by reaffirming a broad federal 
bankruptcy and insolvency power. Looking back from a long-term perspective, the 
outcome in Larue might seem inevitable. However, until Larue there was a great deal of 
uncertainty over the relationship between the federal bankruptcy power and provincial 
jurisdiction. After nearly forty years of provincial rule, the shift to a federal statute was 
an abrupt change for the provinces. The new federal bankruptcy order challenged 
entrenched provincial law, and provincial rights’ advocates saw it as an attack on 
carefully crafted provincial law that was more in tune with local needs.  
This study examines the political and constitutional challenges to the Bankruptcy 
Act from 1919 to 1929. The paper focuses on the 1920s for several reasons. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Debate about Canadian Federalism” (2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev 
329 at 335.  
11 Sylvio Normand, “Un thème dominant de la pensée juridique traditionnelle au Québec: La sauvegarde 
de l’intégrité du droit civil” (1986-87) 32 McGill LJ 559 at 588. Original French: “Au Québec, les juristes 
accueillent froidement la nouvelle loi, y voyant une menace évidente à la pureté du droit civil.” [translated 
by author]. See also Louis-A. Pouliot, “Law Loi de Faillite et les Lois Provinciales” (1926-27) 5 R du D 
104 at 110, 114; Louis-A. Pouliot, “La Loi de Faillite et les Lois Provinciales” (1926-27) 5 R du D 142 at 
146. 
12 Royal Bank of Canada v Larue [1928] AC 187, 8 CBR 579 (PC). 
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Bankruptcy Act of 1919 and the creation of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy in 193213 
are important legislative milestones but in the literature there is little discussion of 
bankruptcy law during the 1920s.  This decade provides an opportunity to study how the 
legal and business community responded to Parliament’s rediscovery of the federal 
bankruptcy and insolvency power. The new Bankruptcy Act of 1919 provided a new 
constitutional battle-ground for those seeking to preserve provincial law from federal 
interference. Since Royal Bank v. Larue ruled in favour of a broad bankruptcy power in 
1928 it provides the end-point of the study. The Great Depression is a distinct and 
separate chapter in the life of Canadian bankruptcy law and federalism.14 
The paper is divided into seven Parts. Part II provides the economic context of the 
1920s and includes official bankruptcy statistics for the decade. Part III provides the 
necessary constitutional law background by highlighting key nineteenth century cases on 
the bankruptcy power. In Part IV, the paper considers how the legal and business 
community defended a broad federal bankruptcy power. In contrast, Part V examines the 
provincial rights’ response to the new Bankruptcy Act found in the political debates of the 
Québec National Assembly and the House of Commons. Part VI details the constitutional 
challenges to the federal bankruptcy power through an examination of reported case law 
from the 1920s. Part VII concludes.  
                                                 
13 An Act to amend The Bankruptcy Act, SC 1932, c 39.  
14 Parliament responded to the Great Depression with the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, SC 
1933, c 36 and the Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, SC Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, SC 
1934, c 53. On the constitutional litigation during the Great Depression legislation see: Virginia Torrie, 
“Protagonists of Company Reorganization: A History of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement (Canada) 
and the Role of Large Secured Creditors” (PhD Thesis, University of Kent, 2015) at 118-127. See 
Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] SCR 659, [1934] 4 DLR 75; British 
Columbia (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney General), [1936] SCR 384, 17 CBR 359, aff’d [1937] 
AC 391, [1937] 1 DLR 695 (PC). 
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II. THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT AND THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 
To better understand the challenges to the bankruptcy regime in the 1920s some 
economic context is necessary. The economy struggled during the “Stuttering Twenties” 
with a depression causing severe unemployment.15 For some areas of the country, 
economic devastation started during the First World War. Southeastern Alberta and 
southwestern Saskatchewan faced a severe drought in the decade following 1916.16  In 
1921, the Queen’s Quarterly reported that Canada was “somewhere near the middle of 
the business depression.”17 The severe downturn lasted until 1925.18  
The depression in the early 1920s is reflected in official bankruptcy statistics from 
the Department of Trade and Commerce.19 In 1922, the number of bankruptcies peaked at 
                                                 
15 Michael Bliss, Northern Enterprise: Five Centuries of Canadian Business (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, 1987) at 381, 384. In 1923, the Home Bank of Canada, with seventy branches, failed. Lawrence 
Kryzanowski and Gordon S. Roberts, “Canadian Banking Solvency, 1922-1940” (1993) 25: 3 J Money, 
Credit & Banking 361 at 364.  See Home Bank of Canada, Re, [1923] 54 O.L.R. 606, 4 DLR 891, (Ont. 
H.C.) cited in Stephanie Ben-Ishai, “Bank Bankruptcy in Canada: A Comparative Perspective” (2009) 
BFLR 25 at 60. 
16 See David C Jones, “We’ll All be Buried Down Here” The Prairie Dryland Disaster 1917-1926 
(Calgary: Historical Society of Alberta, 1986) at xxix; David C. Jones, Empire of Dust: Settling and 
Abandoning the Prairie Dry Belt (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1987); Curtis R McManus, 
Happyland: A History of the ‘Dirty Thirties in Saskatchewan, 1914-1937 (Calgary, University of Calgary 
Press, 2011). 
17 “Business Cycles and the Depression of 1920-21” (1921) 29 Queen’s Quarterly 60. See also Angus 
Lyell, “The Bankruptcy Act in Operation” 66:2 Monetary Times (14 January 1921) 26; HP Grundy, 
“Bankruptcy Act a Real Benefit” 78:24 Monetary Times (17 June 1927) 14.  
18 James Struthers, “Prelude to the Depression: The Federal Government and Unemployment, 1918-29” 
(1977) 58:3 Can Hist Rev 277. 
19 1921 is the first full year under the new bankruptcy regime since it came into effect on July 1, 1920. For 
bankruptcy statistics for the calendar year 1921, see House of Commons Debates, 14th Parl, 2nd Sess, vol I 
(8 March 1923) at 938. For bankruptcy statistics for 1922 to 1924, see Canada, Department of Trade and 
Commerce, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, “Commercial Failures in Canada December 1925”, (Ottawa: 
DTC, 1925) at 7; for 1925 to 1931, see Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce, Dominion Bureau of 
Statistics, “Commercial Failures in Canada for December 1931 With Totals for the Calendar Year 1931”, 
(Ottawa: DTC, 1932) at 8. 
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3,925. Bankruptcies never reached this level during the Great Depression.20 The 
bankruptcy statistics did not go unnoticed. In 1923, a Member of Parliament referred to 
the rising bankruptcy numbers as “an enormous total in a land of unlimited resources, a 
land whose people are willing workers, a land…which offers every possible stimulus to 
progress.”21 Within two years of the Bankruptcy Act coming into force Canada 
experienced a significant bankruptcy crisis. This may have contributed to the belief that 
there was something inherently wrong with the bankruptcy regime.  
  
                                                 
20 For bankruptcy statistics for 1932 to 1941, see Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce, Dominion 
Bureau of Statistics, “Commercial Failures in Canada in the Calendar Year 1941 and in December 1941”, 
(Ottawa: DTC, 1942) at 3. 
 
21 House of Commons Debates, 14th Parl, 2nd Sess, vol I (26 February 1923) at 648. 
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Bankruptcy Law in operation.”22 Lawyers “owing to the novelty of the Law, are 
just familiarizing themselves with it.”23  
The new legislation created interpretative challenges. The legal community 
understood that the Bankruptcy Act was not a self-contained code24 and that to discover 
the meaning of the statute one had to resort to case law.25 But early commentary 
lamented that little case law had yet to emerge.26 The uncertainty ushered in by the new 
Act is best illustrated by a 1921 book review of an English27 bankruptcy text published 
in the Canada Law Journal. The reviewer suggested that the English book might offer 
some interpretative assistance:  
We of this Dominion are now again paddling our little canoe in the troubled 
waters of insolvency, and will be glad of any assistance for our new venture as set 
forth in the Dominion Statutes of 1920, in the Act which  came  into force on  July  
1st of  this year.28 
 
Lawyers practicing in the French language faced a further problem. In January 
1922, Lewis Duncan reported in his bankruptcy text that “owing to prevailing prices, 
                                                 
22 Book Review of A Short View of Bankruptcy Laws by Edward Mason, (1920) 40 Can L Times 1058 at 
1058. See also Angus Lyell, “The Bankruptcy Act and its Defects” 33:10 Saturday Night  (20 December 
1919) 27 
23 Book Review of The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy Law in Canada by Lewis Duncan, (1922) 42 Can 
L Times 215. 
 
24 Professor JT Herbert, “An Unsolicited Report on Legal Education in Canada” (1921) 41 Can L Times 
593.  
 
25 Professor JT Herbert, “An Unsolicited Report on Legal Education in Canada” (1921) 41 Can L Times 
593.  
26 Book Review of The Law and Practice in Bankruptcy, 12th ed, by Right Hon RL Vaughn-
Williams & William Mansell, (1921) 57:12 Can LJ 286. 
 
27 The Canadian Bankruptcy Act of 1919 was based upon the English Bankruptcy Act of 1914, however, 
there were significant differences. Duncan, in his text, made no apologies for relying upon English case 
law. See Lewis Duncan, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1922) at viii. 
28 Book Review of The Law and Practice in Bankruptcy, 12th ed, by Right Hon RL Vaughn-Williams & 
William Mansell, (1921) 57:12 Can LJ 286. 
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the publishers had not seen their way clear to print the French text of the Act and 
Rules.”29  Parliament added to the chaos by amending the Act three times by the end of 
the 1922.30 This caused Greenshields J. of the Québec Court of Appeal to state that 
during the “short period of life of the Act”31 Parliament had amended the Act such that 
“it is scarcely recognizable in its present form.” Greenshields J. urged that other 
amendments could be made “making clear what is evidently ambiguous.”32 
The rising number of bankruptcies and the uncertain state of the law left the 
legislation open to widespread criticism. Months after Parliament proclaimed the Act, 
the Toronto weekly, Saturday Night published an article entitled: “The Bankruptcy Act 
and its Defects”.33 The author described the Act as “cumbersome”34 and lamented its 
many “loopholes”.35 Saturday Night published a follow up article entitled: “Present 
Canadian Bankruptcy Act will not Do”.36  The article called for amendments to “clarify 
the obscurity which now hangs in a cloud” over the Act 37 One author predicted 
                                                 
29 Lewis Duncan, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1922) at ix. 
30 An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1920, c 34; An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1921, c 
17; An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1922, c 8, 
31 John W Danforth v The Riordon Co., [1922] 1 DLR 843 at 852 (Que CA), rev’d on other grounds 
Riordon Co v John W Danforth Co, [1923] SCR 319. 
32 John W Danforth v The Riordon Co [1922] 1 DLR 843 at 852 (Que CA), rev’d on other grounds Riordon 
Co v John W Danforth Co, [1923] SCR 319. 
33 Angus Lyell, “The Bankruptcy Act and its Defects” 33:10 Saturday Night 27 (20 December 1919) 27. 
During this era Saturday Night represented the views of “upper middle-class English-speaking 
Torontonians.” See Index to Saturday Night, Libris Canadiana, online: <www.Libris.ca>. 
 
34 Angus Lyell, “The Bankruptcy Act and its Defects” 33:10 Saturday Night (20 December 1919) 27. 
35 Angus Lyell, “The Bankruptcy Act and its Defects” 33:10 Saturday Night (20 December 1919) 27.  
36 Terence Sheard, “Present Canadian Bankruptcy Act Will Not Do”) 40:9 Saturday Night (17 January 
1925) 13. 
37 Terence Sheard, “Present Canadian Bankruptcy Act Will Not Do” 40:9 Saturday Night (17 January 
1925) 13 at 18. 
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“radical amendments” after one or two years of experience with the new Act.38 The 
lack of government supervision of trustees in bankruptcy, who were responsible for 
administering bankrupt estates, also provided a source of opposition to the new 
legislation.39 One author suggested that bankrupt estates “were actually administered 
by persons who had been convicted of offences or who were bankrupt.”40  
In the 1920s, critics of the Bankruptcy Act also drew upon the nineteenth century 
belief that debtors had a moral obligation to re-pay debts.41 Saskatchewan businesses 
raised the concern about the ease with which insolvent debtors could “pass through the 
Bankruptcy Court and escape their obligations.”42 The Regina Leader reported that in 
Saskatchewan debtors could declare bankruptcy every three months and then start 
business again after each bankruptcy filing. Too many debtors were getting back into 
bankruptcy “before they had spent sufficient time on the penitent bench.”43 Thus, 
“whole moral fabric of business is being endangered” by debtor practices.44 The 
Québec government complained that the Bankruptcy Act was too lenient and prevented 
                                                 
38 Angus Lyell, “Bankruptcy Act in Operation” 66:2 Monetary Times (14 January 1921) 26. See also call 
for amendments in “The Bankruptcy Act” (1921) 57:2 Can LJ  41 at 44.  
39 Bram Thomson, “Canadian Bankruptcy Act—Monopoly of the Trusteeship and of the Law” (1921) 41 
Can LT 96. The trustee problem will be considered in a future study: Thomas GW Telfer, “The New 
Bankruptcy ‘Detective Agency’? The Origins of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy in Great Depression 
Canada” The Canadian Confederation: Past, Present, and Future Conference (Université de Montréal, 
Quebec May 16-18, 2017). 
40 Lewis Duncan, “The Bankruptcy Amendment Act of 1932” (1932) 2 Fortnightly LJ 83. 
41 “Creditors Given Absolute Control under Bankruptcy” 17 Financial Post (1 June 1923) 13. See also 
“Repeated Bankruptcies” (1923) 3 CBR 721. 
42 “Bankruptcy Should be Unprofitable” 17 Financial Post (9 March 1923) 10. 
43 “Bankruptcy Should be Unprofitable” Regina Leader as reported by 17 Financial Post (9 March 1923) 
10. 
44 “Bankruptcy Should be Unprofitable” 17 Financial Post (9 March 1923) 10. 
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farmers from obtaining credit in the province.45 Conversely, the legislation was 
criticized for making it too hard for debtors to access relief. In “drought-stricken prairie 
areas” insolvent farmers had difficulty in obtaining their discharge due to high fees and 
because of the obligation under the Act to keep proper books.46 These beliefs cultivated 
popular feelings of mistrust in the new federal legislation.  
Professor John Falconbridge published a powerful critique of the Bankruptcy Act 
in the Canadian Bar Review in 1926. The article, simply entitled “Why?”,47 
accumulated 17 detailed and largely technical interpretive questions that had emerged 
as Falconbridge prepared his Bankruptcy lectures for his Osgoode Hall class. 
Falconbridge called for a serious effort to improve the drafting of the Act.48 Parliament 
sought to remedy the numerous defects by passing six amending Acts between 1920 
and 1927.49 However, such legislation could not forestall the provincial rights 
movement and constitutional litigation which would eventually end up before the Privy 
Council in 1928. 
III. THE BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY POWER IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY  
To provide context for the political and constitutional challenges to the 
Bankruptcy Act in the 1920s it is necessary to briefly review nineteenth century 
                                                 
45 Hector B McKinnon, “Bankruptcy Act Warmly Attacked” The Globe (18 July 1924) 3. 
46 Hector B McKinnon, “Bankruptcy Act Warmly Attacked” The Globe (18 July 1924) 3. 
47 John Falconbridge, “Why?” (1926) 4:10 Can Bar Rev 695. 
48 John Falconbridge, “Why?” (1926) 4:10 Can Bar Rev 695. 
49 Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1920, c 34; Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1921, c 17; Act 
to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1922, c 8; Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1923, c 31; Act to 
Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1925, c 31; Act Respecting Bankruptcy, RSC 1927, c 11.  
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jurisprudence on the bankruptcy and insolvency power.50  Two key nineteenth century 
decisions of the Privy Council influenced the direction of case law in the 1920s. In 
1880, the Privy Council provided a very clear answer to the question of the relationship 
between the federal bankruptcy power and provincial jurisdiction over property and 
civil rights. In Cushing v Dupuy,51 the Privy Council concluded: “it would be 
impossible to advance a step”52 in bankruptcy proceedings “without interfering with 
and modifying some of the ordinary rights of property, and other civil rights.”53   
It is therefore to be presumed, indeed it is a necessary implication, that the Imperial 
statute, in assigning to the Dominion Parliament the subjects of bankruptcy and 
insolvency, intended to confer on it legislative power to interfere with property, civil 
rights, and procedure within the Provinces, so far as a general law relating to those 
subjects might affect them. 54 
 
The Privy Council effectively recognized that “the federal power over bankruptcy and 
insolvency could not be effective if it did not authorize substantial modifications of the 
ordinary rights of property and contract.”55 
 
With the repeal of the federal Insolvent Act in 1880, questions arose about the 
constitutionality of the provincial assignments and preferences legislation in the 
                                                 
50 See also, Thomas GW Telfer, Ruin and Redemption: The Struggle for a Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 
1867-1919 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2014) at 
94-95, 116-125.  
51 (1880), 5 App Cas 409. 
52 Cushing v Dupuy (1880), 5 App Cas 409 at 415, 416. 
53 Cushing v Dupuy (1880), 5 App Cas 409 at 415, 416. 
54 Cushing v Dupuy (1880), 5 App Cas 409 at 415, 416. The Supreme Court of Canada in 1883 followed 
the lead of Cushing v Dupuy and adopted the principle that Parliament had a broad right under its 
bankruptcy power to interfere with property and civil rights. See Shields v Peak (1883) 8 S.C.R. 579. 
55 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) (loose-leaf updated 2015, release 
1) ch 25 at 3. 
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absence of a federal bankruptcy statute.56 In 1894, the Privy Council upheld a 
provision of an Ontario Act in Ontario (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney 
General)[Voluntary Assignments Case].57 The decision had two immediate impacts. 
First, it enabled the provincial era of debtor-creditor regulation to continue unscathed.58 
Second, the decision effectively stalled federal bankruptcy reform efforts. However, 
over the longer term, the case also had significant constitutional consequences for the 
interpretation of the federal bankruptcy power. 
Given that the Privy Council did not find the provincial provision ultra vires, one 
might argue that the Voluntary Assignments Case interpreted the bankruptcy power 
narrowly.59  Further, one might align the outcome in the case with a broader trend in 
federalism jurisprudence at the end of the nineteenth century that saw the Privy 
Council, under Lord Watson, limit the powers of Parliament.60 However, a portion of 
the judgment supported a broad reading of the bankruptcy power.  
                                                 
56 Thomas GW Telfer, Ruin and Redemption: The Struggle for a Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 1867-1919 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2014) at 116-126. 
57 [1894] AC 189 (PC). 
 
58 Thomas GW Telfer, Ruin and Redemption: The Struggle for a Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 1867-1919 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2014) at 122-126. 
59 Albert Bohémier, Faillite et Insolvabilité, vol 1, (Montreal:  Éditions Thémis, 1992) at 24, cited in, 
Canada, Department of Justice, “Bankruptcy and Insolvency, by Albert Bohémier, a study presented to the 
Civil Law Section of the Department of Justice of Canada, online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-
sjc/harmonization/bohemier/bankr-failli.html#ednref2>. See also W Ivor Jennings, “Constitutional 
Interpretation: The Experience of Canada” (1937-38) 51 Harv L Rev 1 at 13. John T Saywell’s analysis of 
Lord Watson’s interjections during arguments demonstrates that the Board favoured allowing the provinces 
to act while the Dominion did not exercise its bankruptcy power. See John T Saywell, The Lawmakers: 
Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Osgoode 
Society for Canadian Legal History) at 130-132. 
60 JR Mallory, Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada (University of Toronto Press, 1954) at 29. 
See also Peter Hogg & Wade Wright, “Canadian Federalism, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court: 
Reflections on the Debate about Canadian Federalism” (2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev 329 at 339. See also John 
T Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History) at 114-116. 
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In 1894, leading constitutional scholar A.H.F. Lefroy61 concluded that the Voluntary 
Assignments Case “possesses much constitutional interest by reason of the dicta in the 
concluding portions”62 of the decision. In the second last paragraph of the judgment the 
Lord Chancellor,63 Lord Herschell64 took the opportunity to re-state the breadth of that 
federal bankruptcy power: 
[A] system of bankruptcy legislation may frequently require various ancillary provisions 
for the purpose of preventing the scheme of the Act from being defeated. It may be 
necessary for this purpose to deal with the effect of executions and other matters which 
would otherwise be within the legislative competence of the provincial legislature.  
 
Their Lordships do not doubt that it would be open to the Dominion Parliament to deal 
with such matters as part of a bankruptcy law, and the provincial legislature would 
doubtless be then precluded from interfering with this legislation in as much as such 
interference would affect the bankruptcy law of the Dominion Parliament.65 
 
Lefroy reasoned that the effect of this Privy Council statement was “one of the first 
instances of the Dominion Parliament ‘scoring’ before the Privy Council.”66 Confident 
                                                 
61 See RCB Risk, “A.H.F. Lefroy: Common Law Thought in Late Nineteenth Century Canada—On 
Burying One’s Grandfather” in G Blaine Baker & Jim Phillips, eds, A History of Canadian Legal Thought: 
Collected Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 
2006) at 66.  
62 AHF Lefroy, “The Privy Council on Bankruptcy” (1894) 30:6 Can LJ (NS) 182 at 186. Lord Herschell’s 
statement has also be characterized as obiter by a modern authority. See Pierre Carignan, “La Competence 
Legislative en Matiere de Faillite et d’Insolvabilite” (1979) 57 Can Bar Rev 47 at 61. 
63 See RFV Heuston, The Lives of the Lord Chancellors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) at 102. 
64 Perhaps it is not surprising that Lord Herschell took the opportunity to emphasize the federal bankruptcy 
power. Before becoming Lord Chancellor, Farrer Herschell had served as Solicitor General at the time 
England enacted a comprehensive Bankruptcy Act in 1883 with many crediting his leading role in obtaining 
the passage of the Bill. See The Right Honourable Lord James of Hereford, “The Late Lord Herschell, In 
Memoriam” (1899) 1:2 J Soc Comp Legis n.s. 201 at 202. See also Patrick Polden, “Farrer Herschell” in 
HCG Matthew & Brian Harrison, eds, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); EM, “Builders of our Law: Lord Herschell” (1902-3) 2:2 Can L Rev 88 at 90. For 
a summary of a realist vision of statutory interpretation see Randal Graham, “What Judges Want: Judicial 
Self-interest and Statutory Interpretation” (2009) 30:1 Statute LR 38 at 42-51.  
 
65 Ontario (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney General) [1894] AC 189 (PC) at para 27. 
66 AHF Lefroy, “The Privy Council on Bankruptcy” (1894) 30:6 Can LJ (NS) 182 at 193. 
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of the importance of this dicta, Lefroy concluded that in considering how much 
provincial jurisdiction might be “incidentally invaded”67 by Parliament: 
[T]heir lordships seem to have left it, in its relation to the provincial legislatures, almost in 
as happy a position as a man occupied towards his wife in the good old days, when he 
could say, “What is yours is mine, but what is mine's my own.”68  
  
In 1894, Lord Herschell’s statements on the scope of Dominion power did not 
have an immediate impact as there was no federal bankruptcy statute.  But his dicta and 
the finding in Cushing v Dupuy would be locked away in the law books ready to be 
used whenever federal law was revived.69 After Parliament enacted a new bankruptcy 
law in 1919, Lord Herschell’s dicta ultimately became entrenched as part of Canadian 
law.  
IV. THE BANKRUPTCY POWER AT THE OUTSET OF THE 1920s 
Defenders of a broad federal bankruptcy power at the beginning of the 1920s 
relied upon nineteenth century constitutional case law to address any concerns about 
the validity of the federal law and the possibility of encroaching upon provincial 
property and civil rights jurisdiction.70 The drafter of the Bankruptcy Act, HP 
Grundy,71 published a “Synopsis of the Canadian Bankruptcy Act” in 1920.72  To 
                                                 
67 AHF Lefroy, “The Privy Council on Bankruptcy” (1894) 30:6 Can LJ (NS) 182 at 193. 
68 AHF Lefroy, “The Privy Council on Bankruptcy” (1894) 30:6 Can LJ (NS) 182 at 193.  
69 See WHP Clement, The Law of the Canadian Constitution, 3rd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1916) at 803-809; 
AHF Lefroy, Canada's Federal System: Being a Treatise on Canadian Constitutional Law under the 
British North America Act (Toronto: Carswell, 1913) at 288, 293. 
70 Justice Fisher, “The Bankruptcy Law of Canada” 73:3 Monetary Times (18 July 1924) 18. 
71 For Grundy’s role in the drafting of the Act see Thomas GW Telfer, Ruin and Redemption: The Struggle 
for a Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 1867-1919 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Osgoode Society for 
Canadian Legal History, 2014) at 146. 
72 HP Grundy, “A Synopsis of the Canadian Bankruptcy Act” (1920-21) 1 CBR 325. 
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answer the question of the constitutionality of the new Act, Grundy simply quoted 
from Cushing v Dupuy and the Voluntary Assignments Case and stated:  
It would accordingly appear that in case any conflict should arise between the Dominion 
Act and any provincial Act on the subject of bankruptcy and insolvency or matters 
ancillary thereto, even if such ancillary matters would ordinarily be within the powers of 
the provincial legislation, the provisions of the Dominion Act would prevail.73 
 
J.A.C. Cameron, a Master in Chambers, Supreme Court of Ontario74 published 
the first Canadian bankruptcy text in 1920.75 Citing Cushing v Dupuy and the 
Voluntary Assignments Case, Cameron concluded that the Bankruptcy Act of 1919 was 
a direct interference with provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights. He 
asked, “has the Dominion Parliament jurisdiction to enact the present legislation? It is 
submitted that it has.”76 Certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Act directly related to 
civil procedure and “would repeal by implication any conflicting provincial statutes.”77 
Specifically referring to Lord Herschell’s dicta in the Voluntary Assignments Case 
(although by 1920 the passage was embraced as a general principle and it was no 
longer referred to as dicta) Cameron reasoned that if provincial legislation had an 
effect of interfering with the Bankruptcy Act then such provincial legislation would be 
ultra vires.78 
                                                 
73 HP Grundy, “A Synopsis of the Canadian Bankruptcy Act” (1920-21) 1 CBR 325 at 327. 
74 “Law of Bankruptcy in Canada” (1920) 31:6 Trust Companies 627.  
75 JAC Cameron, The Law of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1920). 
76 JAC Cameron, The Law of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1920) at 3.  
77 JAC Cameron, The Law of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1920) at 7. 
78 JAC Cameron, The Law of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1920) at 8. 
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In 1922, Lewis Duncan, a Toronto lawyer,79 published The Law and Practice of 
Bankruptcy in Canada.80 Duncan also cited Cushing v Dupuy and the Voluntary 
Assignments Case to support a broad federal bankruptcy power. The Voluntary 
Assignments Case was of “considerable importance.”81 The case enabled Parliament to 
“pass complete and fully rounded legislation.” 82 
Dominion provisions which are truly ancillary or…necessarily incidental to a general 
bankruptcy or insolvency law may effect a virtual repeal of provincial legislation. There 
can be no direct repeal; but if the two are in conflict the Dominion enactment must 
prevail.83 
 
It was inevitable that the defense of the federal power also involved direct attacks 
on provincial law and provincial jurisdiction since there were many provincial statutes 
that might infringe upon the newly exercised federal bankruptcy power. Federal law 
would do away with the “cumbersome and unsatisfactory” provincial law that involved 
“tedious delays and heavy expenses.”84 However, criticisms of provincial law went 
beyond claims of inefficiency. On July 5, 1919 the Financial Post headline read, 
“Bankruptcy Act will Help Business World: New Measure Wipes out Variety of 
                                                 
79 Lewis Duncan, would later challenge Lord Haldane’s view of Confederation in constitutional arguments 
before the Privy Council. See John T Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of 
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81 Lewis Duncan, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1922) at 24. 
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83 Lewis Duncan, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1922) at 24. The 
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Provincial Laws”.85 In 1921, the Monetary Times stated: “there is no doubt that the 
Dominion statute rides across provincial enactments here and there.”86 The Globe 
proclaimed that the Bankruptcy Act would “abrogate and annul existing Provincial 
laws.”87  
V.  THE PROVINCIAL RESPONSE TO THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1919 
The attack on provincial law did not go unnoticed. In 1921, the Monetary Times 
reported that some of the provincial governments had complained that the Bankruptcy Act 
“overrides a good deal of provincial legislation.”88 In that same year, the Canada Law 
Times published an article calling for the amendment of the Bankruptcy Act to make it 
clear that the administration of voluntary assignments and receiving orders were to be 
governed by “the general laws of the Province affecting the transfer of property.”89 
Two provinces forged ahead with their own means of debtor relief legislation. In 
response to the economic devastation in the West, Alberta and Saskatchewan passed debt 
adjustment legislation90 designed to “relieve the distress of resident farmers.”91 The 
                                                 
85  “Bankruptcy Act Will Help Business World: New Measure Wipes out Variety of Provincial Laws” 13 
Financial Post (5 July 1919) 16. 
 
86 “Bankruptcy Act still in Process” 66:5 Monetary Times (4 February 1921) 8. 
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legislation protected the farmer from “execution and foreclosure” and gave administrative 
boards the “power to prevent a creditor from using oppressively the machinery provided 
by law to enable a creditor to assert his rights against his debtor.”92 Although the Alberta 
Debt Adjustment Act was ultimately ruled to be ultra vires by the Privy Council in 
1943,93 the debt adjustment legislation of the 1920s marked an aggressive move by two 
prairie provinces that must have considered the new Bankruptcy Act “insufficient or 
poorly suited to their regional needs.”94 
Politicians in the Quebec National Assembly and some Quebec Liberal MPs 
launched political attacks against the Bankruptcy Act. In challenging the new federal 
statute politicians also raised constitutional arguments against the federal bankruptcy 
power which they claimed interfered with provincial jurisdiction. These constitutional 
arguments, perhaps strategically raised in the political arena, eventually found their way 
into lower court constitutional judgments in Quebec. In December 1922, the National 
Assembly of Québec adopted a resolution inviting the federal government to revoke the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1919. According to the resolution, the Bankruptcy Act invited 
dishonesty, and fraud and ruined credit.95 Members of the National Assembly were also 
                                                                                                                                                 
article, “Protection of Consumer-Borrowers—Limitations on the Remedies of Consumer-Lenders” (1968) 
33 Sask L Rev 58 at 83-84. 
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concerned about the intrusiveness of the federal law and sought to defend Québec civil 
law. Louis Létourneau claimed that the federal bankruptcy law “makes litter of the spirit 
and letter of our codes.”96 The forty-year experience of provincial jurisprudence under 
the Civil Code “was set to zero and replaced by federal legislation.”97 Québec law 
relating to the transfer of property “was abolished and became a dead letter.”98 
Létourneau claimed that the Bankruptcy Act “violated the constitution of the country 
since it trampled underfoot the rights and prerogatives of the legislatures in matters of 
civil law.”99 Québec Liberal Premier, Louis-Alexandre Taschereau100 opened his speech 
with a direct attack on the federal bankruptcy law claiming it was “an ultra vires act”.101 
He announced that he would convene a committee of Québec jurists to study the 
Bankruptcy Act. If the committee concluded that the bankruptcy legislation was 
unconstitutional, the government of Québec would challenge the legislation in the 
Supreme Court of Canada and the Privy Council. Taschereau promised to do everything 
possible to have the Bankruptcy Act set aside “and have the province return to the 
                                                 
96 Quebec, Debates of the National Assembly, 15th Leg, 4th Sess, (5 December 1922) (M Létourneau) 
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provisions of the Civil Code in regard bankruptcy, and, once again, be master at 
home.”102 
Provincial rights arguments also surfaced in the House of Commons in 1923.103 A 
number of Liberal Quebec MPs opposed the Bankruptcy Act.104 On March 26, 1923, 
Quebec Liberal MP Pierre-François Casgrain moved that the Bankruptcy Act should be 
amended or abrogated.105 While Casgrain criticized the law for being too easy on debtors 
and doing little to regulate trustees, he also took the position that the Bankruptcy Act 
“encroaches on our provincial law, on our civil code and procedure.”106 The federal Act 
has been the source of trouble in Québec with Casgrain claiming that “we have been 
forced to spend large sums to ensure the maintenance of our rights” under provincial 
law.107 Casgrain proposed that if the federal statute was not to be repealed then the 
Bankruptcy Act should not apply to Québec. In this way, the rights of Québec would be 
protected and it would allow for the civil code and code of civil procedure to be 
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“maintained in integrity.”108 A fellow Liberal MP from Québec, John Joseph Denis, 
urged the House not to force the federal legislation on Québec which “does not desire to 
accept” the law.109  
Legislators questioned the need for a federal Bankruptcy Act given that provincial 
debtor-creditor legislation had worked for forty years. Joseph Archambault, a Québec 
Liberal MP reminded the House that Québec civil law had adequately dealt with debtors 
but had now been practically “abolished by the federal Bankruptcy Act.” 110 Archambault 
advocated for a return to provincial law as there was “no necessity for uniformity in a 
bankruptcy law.”111 In his concluding remarks, Archambault strongly defended 
provincial jurisdiction: “I do submit that when the law of bankruptcy is so closely related 
to civil rights, the Dominion parliament should be very chary about legislating in this 
area.”112 Paul Mercier, another Liberal MP from Québec, supported the retention of 
provincial law. Provincial law “had been enacted according to provincial necessities and 
customs.” In contrast, Parliament had constructed a bankruptcy law “for the whole 
Dominion…without consulting the provincial attorneys-general and the legislatures.”113 
There was a fear in Québec that the bankruptcy legislation was part of a larger trend to 
centralize law at the expense of provincial jurisdiction: 
                                                 
108 House of Commons Debates, 14th Parl, 2nd Sess, vol II (26 March 1923) at 1500 (Pierre Casgrain, 
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The tendency to centralize and unify legislation is becoming more and more visible…and 
there seems to be an admitted attempt to encroach on provincial rights and attack our civil 
laws.114 
 
In Quebec, there was also a belief that Parliament was seeking to impose English 
law on the province. In 1923, the Monetary Times published an editorial: 
Quite probably Quebec would also be better satisfied were it not for the fact that the 
bankruptcy legislation is an effort to impose English law, and that this may be but the 
first effort for much other legislation of a like nature.115  
 
John-Joseph Denis a Québec Liberal MP gave voice to this idea in the House of 
Commons in 1923 during the repeal debate. Denis pointed out that the Canadian 
Bankruptcy Act had been transplanted from England and that he opposed “the importation 
of laws from England.”116  The Act was a “replica of an English law, passed some forty 
years ago. We have had too much copying of English laws in this country.” Denis argued 
that conditions in Europe were much different than the situation in Canada. He objected 
to the bankruptcy law because it was “not suited to the people of Canada.” In particular, 
the Bankruptcy Act was “not suited to the requirements” of the Québec people.117 
Casgrain, who had moved the motion for repeal concluded the debate by noting that 
Québec “is afraid of any invasion of English law under the new system.”118 Casgrain 
ultimately withdrew his repeal motion.119  
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The concerns raised by Quebec politicians were consistent with “traditional legal 
thought in Quebec.”120  Sylvio Normand’s study of Revue du Droit articles published 
during the 1920s demonstrates that there was a  “a dominant theme” of protecting “the 
integrity of civil law”.121 Quebec authors opposed the unification of Canadian law, 
appeals to the Privy Council and the spread of federal statutes.122 Bankruptcy law allowed 
the civil code to be infiltrated by “foreign law” through the use of jurisprudence from 
other provinces.123  The Bankruptcy Act could “not cause a creditor to lose any rights or 
privileges” acquired under provincial law.124 More importantly the new bankruptcy 
regime permitted bankrupts to obtain a discharge from their debts. Before 1919, this 
remedy was not available under provincial law. The Bankruptcy Act, therefore, interfered 
with Quebec civil law by introducing a new means of debt relief.125 The only solution 
was repeal.126 
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 In the House of Commons federalists responded to the Quebec position.127 SW 
Jacobs, also a Quebec Liberal MP,128  challenged the Québec perspective of the 
Constitution offered by his colleagues in the House: 
It is wrong for our people in…Quebec to say that the act, which the Parliament of Canada 
has a right to impose on the whole of the Dominion of Canada, is an attempt to take from 
the people of the province of Quebec their civil rights and their civil law.129  
 
Jacobs argued that it was not for the House of Commons to “sit in judgment and declare 
whether it was unconstitutional.”130 Rather, Jacobs argued, that was the role of the 
courts.131   
[A]ll these questions—that is the rights of the parliament of Canada, as against the 
provincial legislature, to legislate in matters of bankruptcy—will in due course come 
before the judicial committee of the Privy Council.132  
 
Jacobs was correct in his prediction with the Privy Council finally ruling in 1928 in 
favour of a broad bankruptcy power. However, before 1928 several lower court decisions 
challenged the federal intrusion into provincial matters. Some of the constitutional 
arguments found in the debates of the Québec National Assembly and in Parliament 
eventually found their way into Québec lower court judgments.  
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VI. THE BANKRUPTCY POWER INTERPRETED: CONSTITUTIONAL 
LITIGATION DURING THE 1920s 
The question of whether to repeal the Bankruptcy Act soon gave way to 
constitutional litigation over the scope of the federal bankruptcy power. Perhaps this is 
not surprising. J.R. Mallory argues that new legislation inevitably produces litigation 
which seeks “to exploit the federal division of legislative powers in the constitution” as a 
way of “minimizing the change” created by the statute.133 The change in this context 
involved the end of a near forty-year period of provincial regulation of debtor creditor 
matters without federal interference.  After the long provincial era, the Bankruptcy Act 
marked “a very radical change.”134 Those who hoped for an eventual Privy Council ruling 
in favour of the Dominion in the 1920s had to contend with the possibility that Lord 
Haldane, who served on the Privy Council until 1928, would hear an appeal on the scope 
of the bankruptcy power. Lord Haldane had played a dominant role in reshaping 
Canadian constitutional law and in his judgments Lord Haldane “subordinat[ed]... federal 
power to provincial power, whenever the language of the 1867 Act allowed.”135 From 
Quebec there was an attempt to use Lord Haldane’s federalism jurisprudence to challenge 
the Privy Council’s nineteenth century characterization of a broad bankruptcy power. 
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One Quebec lawyer suggested that Privy Council jurisprudence had evolved since the 
1880 decision of Cushing v Dupuy.136 Relying upon a 1925 Lord Haldane judgment137 the 
lawyer claimed that “the power of the provincial legislatures to regulate civil and 
property rights cannot easily be impeded.”138 As the decade grew to a close, RCB Risk 
notes: “the Dominion’s powers seemed to many Canadians to be a pale image of what 
had been contemplated at Confederation.”139  Would the bankruptcy power suffer the 
same fate? Some early decisions on the bankruptcy power did not favour the Dominion. 
The Quebec Superior Court found a provision of the Bankruptcy Act to be ultra vires and 
several other decisions cast doubt on the federal ability to interfere with property and 
civil rights.  
A. EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE  
Although nineteenth century jurisprudence favoured an extensive bankruptcy 
power, there was little consensus in early court rulings on the relationship between the 
Bankruptcy Act and provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.    Some cases 
gave emphasis to the priority of federal law.140 Thus, Justice Fisher of the Ontario 
Supreme Court characterized the 1880 decision of Cushing v Dupuy to mean that “the 
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140 Royal Bank v Kuproski (1925), 7 CBR 8 at para 31, [1925] 3 DLR 744 (Alta CA), aff’d on other 
grounds [1926] SCR 532 (Parliament intended the Bankruptcy Act to “deal completely with the debtor’s 
estate.”); Hamilton v Vipond (1921), 1 CBR 483 at para 5, 61 DLR 466 (Ont SC) (an assignment for the 
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Parliament of Canada had the right to pass legislation pertaining to the subject of 
bankruptcy and insolvency and in doing so had the right to override provincial 
legislation.”141 However, not all courts initially accepted this premise with many 
decisions of the 1920s adopting a perspective that focused on preserving provincial 
law.142 
Whether the Bankruptcy Act overrode143 provincial legislation was the essential 
issue before the Québec Court of Appeal in Re Rosenzweig in 1921.144 Under provisions 
of the Québec Civil Code, an unpaid seller was entitled to the right of rescission against 
an insolvent trader.145 In this case, the seller sold goods for an immediate cash payment 
of half of the selling price with the balance due within thirty days. On the day of the 
delivery the buyer became bankrupt leading the unpaid seller to assert a right of 
rescission under the Quebec Civil Code. The trustee refused to recognize the seller’s right 
of rescission and retained the goods for the benefit of the estate. The conflicting positions 
of the trustee and the seller forced the Court to consider was whether the bankruptcy of 
the buyer affected the right of the unpaid seller under provincial law. Lamothe C.J. asked 
                                                 
141 Re Electrical Fittings & Foundry Co (1926), 58 OLR 364 ,[1926] 1 DLR 752 (Ont SC) at para 14, 
142 See e.g. In re Churchill, [1919] 2 WWR 541 at para 11 (Man KB) (provincial Assignments Act did not 
“trench on Dominion rights” and was not “in any sense a bankruptcy law.” See also In re St. Thomas 
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144 (1921) 2 CBR 255, 70 DLR 174 (Que CA). 
 
145 In order to exercise this remedy, Art 1543 provided that the goods had to still be in the possession of the 
trader and that the remedy had to be exercised within 30 days of delivery.  
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the question this way: “Has the new bankruptcy law made away with the privileged right 
conferred to the seller by Art. 1543, Civil Code?”146 He answered the question by 
proclaiming that “there is no text of The Bankruptcy Act which says so.”147 The trustee 
argued that the Bankruptcy Act “abolished by implication”148 the unpaid seller’s right of 
rescission. Lamothe C.J. concluded: “Abrogation by implication, in civilized countries, is 
not easily admitted.”149 Abrogation of rights arising under provincial law was “not to be 
presumed.”150 In a concurring opinion Tellier J. offered a similar sentiment: “The 
Bankruptcy Act has effected no change in our former laws concerning sale. The 
privileged rights of the unpaid seller are still the same, they have not been affected.”151 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the unpaid seller’s right of rescission survived the 
bankruptcy.152  
In 1923, the Québec Superior Court ruled that a provision of the Bankruptcy Act 
was ultra vires. In Re Stober, the terms of a commercial lease provided that in the event 
of the insolvency of the lessee, the lease became null and void. It was a further term of 
the agreement that the lease could not be assigned without the consent of the landlord. On 
the bankruptcy of the tenant, the landlord provided the trustee with notice claiming that 
the lease was null and void. The trustee relied on s. 52 of the Bankruptcy Act to retain the 
                                                 
146 Re Rosenzweig (1921) 2 CBR 255, 70 DLR 174 at para 3 (Que CA).   
 
147 Re Rosenzweig (1921) 2 CBR 255, 70 DLR 174 at para 3 (Que CA). 
 
148 Re Rosenzweig (1921) 2 CBR 255, 70 DLR 174 at para 3 (Que CA). 
 
149 Re Rosenzweig (1921) 2 CBR 255, 70 DLR 174 at para 3 (Que CA). 
150 Re Rosenzweig (1921) 2 CBR 255, 70 DLR 174 at para 4 (Que CA). 
151 Re Rosenzweig (1921) 2 CBR 255, 70 DLR 174 at para 24 (Que CA). 
152 For a similar result see Re Prima Skirt Co (1921), 1 CBR 438, 61 DLR 133 (Que SC). 
 31 
leased premises for the remainder of the unexpired term. Specifically, the trustee relied 
upon s. 52(5) which gave the trustee rights “notwithstanding the legal effect of any 
provision or stipulation in any lease.” According to the trustee, this subsection allowed 
him to ignore the terms of the lease and obtain possession of the premises for the 
purposes of an assignment of the lease to a third party.  
The landlord argued that s. 52 of the Bankruptcy Act interfered with 
“contractual rights” and allowed “the annulment of private contracts.” Thus, s. 52 
“legislate[s] on matters affecting civil rights and property…which are constitutionally 
within the sole jurisdiction of the province.”153 The landlord took the position that s. 
52(5) of the Bankruptcy Act was “illegal and unconstitutional and is ultra vires of the 
powers of the Federal Parliament.”154 Therefore, under Québec civil law the lease was 
valid and the decision of the trustee was “illegal and void.”155  
Without citing any authority, the court admitted that the Privy Council had 
established that Parliament may pass legislation which encroaches upon a provincial field 
“if such legislation is ancillary” to the federal power. In these circumstances the federal 
legislation “must prevail.”156 However, the court concluded that s. 52(5) “is not 
legislation ancillary nor necessary to the proper and efficacious working of The 
Bankruptcy Act.”157 The object of bankruptcy legislation was the distribution of property 
and the discharge of the debtor. Here the provision allowed the trustee to expropriate the 
                                                 
153 In Re Stober (1923), 4 CBR 34 para 7 (Que SC). 
154 In Re Stober (1923), 4 CBR 34 at para 7 (Que SC). 
155 In Re Stober (1923), 4 CBR 34 at para 7 (Que SC). 
156 In Re Stober (1923), 4 CBR 34 at para 26 (Que SC). 
157 In Re Stober (1923), 4 CBR 34 at para 27 (Que SC). 
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landlord’s right so as to increase the assets of the bankrupt at the landlord’s expense.158 
The provision was “outside of the bankruptcy domain.”159 The court ruled that s. 52(5) of 
the Bankruptcy Act was “unconstitutional, ultra vires of the powers of the Federal 
Parliament [and] null.”160 Shortly, after this decision Parliament conceded victory to the 
provinces on this issue by repealing s. 52(5) and replacing it with a section which stated 
that in the event of a lessee’s bankruptcy, the rights and priorities of the landlord would 
be governed by the laws of the province in which the leased premises were located. The 
amending Act went further to state that nothing in the Bankruptcy Act shall be deemed to 
limit the legislative authority of any province to regulate landlords’ rights.161 An article in 
La Revue Du Notariat welcomed the repeal of the provision noting that s. 52(5) of the 
Bankruptcy Act had interfered with Quebec law.162 
The outcomes in Rosenzweig and Stober demonstrate an intention to protect 
provincial law from federal interference. A third decision, of the Ontario Court of Appeal 
also took issue with the scope of the federal bankruptcy power.163  In Re Western 
                                                 
158 In Re Stober (1923), 4 CBR 34 at para 32 (Que SC). 
159 In Re Stober (1923), 4 CBR 34 at para 30 (Que SC). 
160 In Re Stober (1923), 4 CBR 34 at para 34 (Que SC). See Louis-A Pouliot, “La Loi de Faillite et les 
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161 Lloyd Houlden, Geoffrey Morawetz & Janis Sarra, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada, 4th ed at 
para G§124 (WL). See An Act to Amend The Bankruptcy Act SC 1923, c 31, s 31. On the provincial 
legislation that followed this amendment see WJ Tremeear, “Rent Priorities in Bankruptcy” (1924-25) 4 
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162 W. Deschênes, “La loi Canadienne des faillites” (1924) 26: 11 Rev du Notariat 321 at 333. 
163 For a discussion of Ontario relations with the federal government during the 1920s see Christopher 
Armstrong, The Politics of Federalism: Ontario’s Relations with the Federal Government, 1867-1942 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981) at 135-146. 
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Canadian Steel Corp, Chief Justice Meredith164 offered a critical perspective of the 
Bankruptcy Act. He suggested that there were provisions of the Bankruptcy Act that 
required amendment.165 In obiter, he challenged the Bankruptcy Act’s interference with 
the administration of the courts in the provinces. He pointed to the provisions of the 
bankruptcy statute which allowed the Minister of Justice to assign judges of provincial 
courts to exercise their powers under the Bankruptcy Act. This enabled the federal 
government to “cast upon the provinces”166 the expense of providing courts to carry on 
work under the Bankruptcy Act. He asked: “Is this not an interference with what is by The 
B.N.A. Act within the exclusive legislative authority of the provinces — the 
administration of justice in the provinces?”167 Finally, again in obiter he suggested that 
there were some provisions “that are probably ultra vires the Dominion Parliament.”168  
B. RIGHTS OF JUDGMENT CREDITORS 
The rights of judgment creditors in a bankruptcy demonstrated another critical 
intersection of the Bankruptcy Act and provincial law. As a fundamental principle, s. 11 
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of the Bankruptcy Act established that every assignment and receiving order had 
precedence over garnishments, attachments, execution or other processes against 
property.169 However, the Act carved out an important exception for the rights of secured 
creditors who had the power “to realize or otherwise deal with his security” 
notwithstanding the bankruptcy.170 Could a judgment creditor, who had taken some 
enforcement steps, such as registration of a judgment against the land of the debtor under 
provincial law be considered a “secured creditor” in the bankruptcy? In some provinces, 
the registration of a judgment entitled the creditor to a proprietary interest in the land. In 
a bankruptcy, would this judgment creditor be able to rely upon provincial law to assert 
secured creditor status or would the trustee in bankruptcy defeat the creditor’s claim 
under s. 11 of the Bankruptcy Act? Having secured creditor status was essential as it 
would mean having priority over the trustee in bankruptcy and ranking ahead of 
unsecured creditors. The scenario provided a classic conflict between provincial law, 
which gave rise to the proprietary interest, and the Bankruptcy Act which took precedence 
over execution processes.  
A 1927 Canadian Bar Review article articulated a policy perspective in favour of 
defeating provincial priority claims. The author argued that the “destruction of judgments 
as preferred claims”171 was necessary for the equitable distribution of the bankrupt’s 
assets. The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act are: 
well within the powers of the Dominion Parliament. Every fictitious lien based on a judgement 
set up by provincial statutes must necessarily go down before the paramount federal 
                                                 
169 Bankruptcy Act, s 11. For early recognition of this problem see “Seizure by a Judgment Creditor After 
Assignment in Bankruptcy” (1921-22) 2 CBR 549. 
170 Bankruptcy Act, s 6.  
171 G Gavan Duffy, “The Value of a Judgment” (1927) 7 Can Bar Rev 405 at 407. 
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legislation and it is difficult to see how the [Bankruptcy]Act could have been differently 
drawn to carry out its manifest purposes more effectually. 172 
 
However, in the early 1920s it was not clear that the courts would adopt this view.  
In 1922, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court in Re Fader heard one of the first cases 
to consider the status of registered judgments in a bankruptcy.173 Rather than dismissing 
the judgment creditor’s claim for secured creditor status in the bankruptcy, the court 
gave leave to the judgment creditors to return to court and argue for a declaration of 
priority on the basis that their registered judgments entitled them to secured creditor 
status in the bankruptcy.174 The following year, the Alberta Court of Appeal indicated 
the uncertainty caused by Re Fader: 
There has been some question raised as to whether a lienholder, whose lien is created by 
virtue of a provincial statute and not by contract, should be treated as coming within the 
meaning of a ‘secured creditor,’ as defined by the [Bankruptcy] Act.175  
 
However, this issue was not raised in argument and the Court of Appeal proceeded on the 
assumption that the plaintiff was a secured creditor.  
  The meaning of “secured creditor” became a matter of contention in Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick. Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act, those provinces had 
passed legislation providing that a registered judgment became “as effective [as] a lien on 
the debtor’s lands as a registered mortgage.”176 If the courts recognized the registered 
judgment as a secured creditor then such a claim would have priority over the trustee. In 
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174 Re Faber (1922) 3 CBR 203 (NSSC) at para 10. 
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Parker-Eakins Co. v Leblanc (Trustee of), the creditor had obtained a judgment and 
registered a certificate judgment in the registry of deeds. When the debtor made an 
authorized assignment, the creditor argued that he was a secured creditor with valid 
security that bound the debtor’s lands notwithstanding the effect of the Bankruptcy Act. 
In addition to asserting secured creditor status, the creditor also argued that the 
Bankruptcy Act destroyed the effect of his registered judgment under provincial law. 
According to the creditor, s. 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, which gave bankruptcy 
proceedings priority over execution processes, “was beyond the legislative powers of the 
Parliament of Canada.”177 
Chisholm J. did not accept the creditors’ arguments and concluded that the 
assignment in bankruptcy took precedence over the registered judgment binding lands. A 
registered judgment against land was not a charge or lien under the Act’s definition of 
secured creditor. A lien mentioned in the definition of secured creditor only meant 
consensual arrangements between the parties and not a lien created by the “recovery and 
recording of a judgment.”178 On the constitutional argument, Chisholm J. reasoned that 
s.11 of the Bankruptcy Act was constitutional. Given that the main purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Act was to distribute assets Chisholm J. reasoned that “at every step...there 
must be an interference with the subject-matter of property and civil rights within the 
province.”179 Parliament had the power:  
                                                 
177 Parker-Eakins Co v Leblanc (Trustee of) (1922), 3 CBR 211 at para 6 (NSSC). 
178 Parker-Eakins Co v Leblanc (Trustee of) (1922), 3 CBR 211 at para 16 (NSSC). 
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to enact, not as ancillary merely to its right to legislate on the subject-matter of bankruptcy but 
as indispensable to effective legislation, laws as to how creditors' claims shall rank, and how 
debtors' assets shall be distributed.180 
 
Russell J. in dissent, concluded that the holder of the registered judgment was a secured 
creditor and therefore had priority over the trustee. However, in reaching his decision 
Russell J. expressed his view on the federalism question: 
The policy of The Bankruptcy Act is, generally, to pay respect to existing provincial legislation. 
Should we not then say that...the lien of the secured creditor shall be preserved? I think this is 
the proper answer.181 
While the majority in Parker-Eakins had given prominence to the Bankruptcy Act, 
a subsequent decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court rejected that approach and 
reached the opposite conclusion. The court In re Rodenhizer concluded that a creditor 
holding a registered judgment was a secured creditor and was therefore entitled to 
priority in the bankruptcy. The Court emphasized that in this case there was a consent 
judgment that was obtained as security for the loan meaning that the loan and judgment 
were obtained at a time when the debtor was solvent. Mellish J. stated that the 
Bankruptcy Act “has to do with the estates of insolvents.”  
[The Act’s] object is clearly, I think, not to avoid or postpone securities given by solvent 
persons for present bona fide consideration.... Legislation with such an object in view would, I 
think, come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the local authority and cannot, I think, be said 
to be ancillary or incidental to legislation on the subject of bankruptcy or insolvency. 
It appears in this case the court was seeking to preserve the local practice of using 
consent judgments in the province. Mellish J. A noted that a consent judgment was an 
“effective and usual form of security taken by those loaning money to solvent people” in 
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Nova Scotia. The decisions in Re Faber and Rodnhizer raised doubts about the interface 
between provincial legislation, which treated judgment creditors like secured creditor 
rights, and a bankruptcy. A 1927 article cast doubt on the reasoning of these decisions. 
Only a proper understanding of the Bankruptcy Act “helps clear away the imaginary 
difficulties”182 raised by the cases. The author also offered practical advice for 
prospective lenders: “Money lenders who advance money on a judgment which may be 
destroyed by bankruptcy instead of insisting on mortgage, which will survive, do so with 
full knowledge and have no grievance.” 183 These early lower court decisions did not 
resolve the issue of registered judgments in a bankruptcy. A Québec case would 
ultimately provide the Privy Council with its first opportunity to make a twentieth 
century constitutional pronouncement on the question of whether the Bankruptcy Act 
“infringe[d] upon the provincial property and civil rights jurisdiction.”184  
C. ROYAL BANK v. LARUE   
On January 19, 1928, the Privy Council released its judgment in Royal Bank of 
Canada v Larue.185 Although still a member of the Privy Council, Lord Haldane did not 
participate in the Larue decision, and the overall result emphasized a broad reading of the 
bankruptcy and insolvency power.186 The Privy Council relied upon Lord Herschell’s 
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statement in the Voluntary Assignments Case and ruled that the Dominion had the right 
under the Bankruptcy Act to postpone creditors’ rights established by provincial law. The 
case began in 1922 and would take six years before the Privy Council ruled. The lower 
court rulings in Larue demonstrate that a broad reading of the federal bankruptcy power 
was not a foregone conclusion.  The Québec Superior Court, the Québec Court of Appeal 
and a dissenting judge in the Supreme Court of Canada sought to preserve the Quebec 
Civil Code from federal interference. Many of the arguments initially raised in the 
Quebec National Assembly and in the House of Commons can be found in these three 
judgments.   
In March of 1922, the Royal Bank obtained a judgment against the debtor and 
subsequently registered it. The registration referred to the debtor’s real estate and 
established a judicial hypothec on that property in accordance with the Québec Civil 
Code. Before the Bank took any steps to enforce the judicial hypothec, the debtor made 
an assignment under the Bankruptcy Act. The Bank subsequently filed a claim with the 
trustee claiming a “privilege in…the nature of a judicial hypothec upon the real estate of 
the debtor.” The trustee rejected the Bank’s claim taking the position that the Bank had 
no privileged claim and that an assignment in bankruptcy had precedence over the Bank’s 
claim.187 The trustee relied upon s. 11(10) of the Bankruptcy Act, which specifically 
referred to judgments operating as hypothecs. The subsection provided that after the 
registration of the debtor’s assignment in bankruptcy:  
                                                                                                                                                 
Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2002) at 182-183.  
187 A summary of the facts is drawn from Royal Bank of Canada v Larue [1928] AC 187, 8 CBR 579 
(PC). at paras 1-2 and Quebec (Attorney General) v Bélanger, [1926] SCR 218 at paras 1-2. 
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such… assignment shall have precedence of all certificates of judgment, judgments operating 
as hypothecs, executions and attachments against land (except such thereof as have been 
completely executed by payment).188 
 
 In the Québec Superior Court, the Bank argued that the trustee had misinterpreted 
s. 11(10) or in the alternative claimed that the provision was unconstitutional as it 
interfered with the Bank’s rights under Québec civil law.189 Lemieux C.J. ultimately 
ruled that the Bank was entitled to proceeds from the bankrupt estate up to the amount of 
its hypothec. His conclusion ultimately rested upon an interpretation of s. 11(10). 
Lemieux C.J. ruled that s. 11(10) gave the trustee the power to realize upon the property 
affected by the hypothec but that the creditor holding the hypothec would have a charge 
over the proceeds.190  
Given his conclusion on the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act, Lemieux C.J. 
did not rule that the provision was ultra vires. However, he did go further and stated that 
if the subsection were intended to avoid the priority of the bank under the Civil Code, the 
provision would fail as it would go beyond the scope of the bankruptcy and insolvency 
power.191 In several bold statements Lemieux C.J. echoed the provincial rights’ sentiment 
found in the Québec National Assembly debates and the repeal debates in the House of 
Commons. First, he reasoned that the Bankruptcy Act did not allow a creditor to be 
“stripped of his rights” nor did Parliament have the “power to deprive a citizen” of rights 
acquired under civil law. Neither, “the sovereign nor the British Parliament, nor any 
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empire’s parliament will have the power to remove an inch or right, however small it is to 
a citizen.”192 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial judge thus allowing the Bank 
to keep the proceeds from the sale of the property.193 Like the trial judge, Lafontaine C.J. 
did not rule on the constitutionality of s. 11(10) but he also issued several statements 
which sought to protect Québec law. First, he noted that the some of the words in s. 
11(10) of the Bankruptcy Act were unknown in Québec’s legal language. Lafontaine C.J. 
asserted that this was a “dangerous” matter since one could not “with impunity” 
transplant the legal language of one country and seek to impose them on the legal 
institutions of another country which had an entirely different legal system.194 Second, he 
sought to preserve the rights of the Bank under the Quebec Civil Code. He opposed any 
interpretation which would allow the Bankruptcy Act to have retroactive effect such that a 
creditor would lose “earned rights under civil law.”195  The cancellation of a judicial 
hypothec “has nothing to do with the operation of bankruptcy law.”196 While the two 
lower court decisions had decided the case on the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act, 
both judges indicated that the law would be unconstitutional if the law had encroached 
upon the rights of creditors holding hypothecs.197  
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The Supreme Court of Canada198 upheld the trustee’s decision thereby 
disallowing the Bank’s claim of the judicial hypothec as a privilege in the bankruptcy. 
The majority decision, delivered by Newcombe J. upheld s. 11(10) of the Bankruptcy Act 
as coming with the Dominion’s power to regulate bankruptcy and insolvency. However, 
before turning to the majority decision it is important to highlight the dissenting opinion 
of Rinfret J.199 who sided with the position of the Royal Bank and held that the 
“destruction of the judicial hypothec” was not part of the bankruptcy and insolvency 
power.200 Rinfret J. concluded that the Royal Bank, through its hypothec, had acquired 
the status of secured creditor under the Bankruptcy Act.201 Secured creditors remained 
“entirely outside the bankruptcy proceedings.”202 Therefore the bankrupt’s property did 
not include property affected by the hypothec.203 Rinfret J. was of the view that once the 
hypothec had been registered the Royal Bank acquired a real right in the designated 
building.204 Section 11(10) of the Bankruptcy Act did not provide the intention to 
“deprive a citizen of a completed and acquired right.”205 If hypothecs were only to be 
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valid when the debtor was solvent their protection for creditors would only be illusory. 
Hypothecs only had any real utility to creditors when the debtor became insolvent. If the 
trustee was correct and the Bank’s claim was disallowed, it would effectively remove 
hypothecs from the Civil Code.206 
Turning to the constitutional question, Rinfret J. concluded that the annulment of 
a judicial hypothec before the debtor became insolvent did not have an “essential 
relationship” to the bankruptcy and insolvency power. The federal interference with the 
hypothec was not a “necessary consequence” of bankruptcy and insolvency. Section 
11(10) was not “strictly related to the subject” of bankruptcy or insolvency. Nor was the 
provision ancillary to bankruptcy and insolvency. The federal provision was not 
necessary for the Dominion Parliament to exercise its bankruptcy power given that it 
destroyed the Bank’s rights.207 What concerned Rinfret J. was that the Bank had acquired 
certain rights under provincial law prior to the bankruptcy. He concluded that those parts 
of s. 11(10) that had the effect of destroying the judicial hypothec were not part of the 
federal bankruptcy power.208  
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada came to the opposite conclusion 
and held that s. 11 was unconstitutional. For the majority, Newcombe J. began his 
constitutional analysis by referring back to the two classic nineteenth statements of the 
broad bankruptcy power found in Cushing v Dupuy209 and the Voluntary Assignments 
                                                 
206 Quebec (Attorney General) v Bélanger [1926] SCR 218 at para 49, Rinfret J, dissenting. 
207 Quebec (Attorney General) v Bélanger, [1926] SCR 218 at para 54, Rinfret J, dissenting (WL 
translation). 
208 Quebec (Attorney General) v Bélanger, [1926] SCR 218 at para 58-59, Rinfret J, dissenting. 
209 Cushing v Dupuy (1880), 5 App Cas 409 at 415-416, cited in Quebec (Attorney General) v Bélanger 
[1926] SCR 218 at para 14, Newcombe J. 
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Case.210 In particular, he emphasized Lord Herschell’s statement in the Voluntary 
Assignments Case that bankruptcy legislation “required ancillary provisions for the 
purpose of preventing the scheme of the Act from being defeated.”211 Newcombe J. 
concluded that the Voluntary Assignments Case “clearly recognizes the necessity of” 
including within a bankruptcy statute provisions like s. 11(10):   
[F]ollowing the view expressed by their Lordships, I hold that these enactments belong or 
have strict relation to the subject of bankruptcy and insolvency, and are therefore, as 
provisions of The Bankruptcy Act, within the paramount authority of Parliament.212 
 
Newcombe J. allowed the appeal of the trustee and ordered that the trustee’s disallowance 
of the Bank’s claim should be restored. The Bank appealed to the Privy Council and for 
one Quebec author “the very existence of the judicial hypothec in our Civil Code “was at 
stake.213 The Attorney General of Quebec and the Attorney General of Canada 
intervened.214 
The Bank’s appeal of the Supreme Court judgment provided the first opportunity 
for the Privy Council to render a decision on the bankruptcy power in the twentieth 
century. The Board agreed with the Supreme Court of Canada’s conclusion.215  Viscount 
Cave, the Lord Chancellor, rendered the decision and he posed two questions:  
(1) whether on a proper interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act a registered judicial hypothec 
under Quebec Civil Code is intended to be postponed to an assignment in bankruptcy.  
 
                                                 
210 Ontario (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney General), [1894] AC 189 at para 27 (PC), cited in 
Quebec (Attorney General) v Bélanger [1926] SCR 218 at para 16, Newcombe J. 
211 Ontario (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney General), [1894] AC 189 at para 27 (PC), cited in 
Quebec (Attorney General) v Bélanger, [1926] SCR 218 at para 16, Newcombe J. 
212 Quebec (Attorney General) v Bélanger, [1926] SCR 218 at para 17, Newcombe J. 
213 “Hypothèque judiciaire” (1925-26) 4 R du D 571 at 572 
214 L.P. “Hypothèque judiciaire” (1927-8) 6 R du D 380. 
215 Royal Bank of Canada v Larue [1928] AC 187, 8 CBR 579 (PC). 
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(2) If such a hypothec is postponed by a provision of the Bankruptcy whether such provision 
is “within the legislative authority of the Dominion Parliament.”216  
 
On the first question, the Privy Council concluded that the Bankruptcy Act did postpone a 
judicial hypothec on the real estate of the debtor. It was the intention of the Bankruptcy 
Act that the assignment in bankruptcy should have precedence of all judgments operating 
as hypothecs. 217   
The Privy Council in Larue broadly stated the bankruptcy power and concluded 
that judgment creditors were reduced to an equality in a bankruptcy: 
[T]heir Lordships are of opinion that the exclusive authority thereby given to the Dominion 
Parliament to deal with all matters arising within the domain of bankruptcy and insolvency 
enables that Parliament to determine by legislation the relative priorities of creditors under a 
bankruptcy or an authorized assignment. A creditor who has obtained judgment for his debt 
and has issued execution upon the debtor’s lands or goods remains a creditor; and it is entirely 
within the authority of the Dominion Parliament to declare that such a creditor...shall on the 
occurrence of bankruptcy...be reduced to an equality with the general body of creditors.218  
 
The Privy Council went further and stated that there was nothing in the nature of a 
Québec judicial hypothec which exempted it from the impact of the federal bankruptcy 
statute: 
No doubt it was within the competence of the provincial Legislature to give to a judicial 
hypothec the quality of a real right; but if and so soon as that enactment comes into conflict 
with a Dominion statute duly passed under the authority of sec. 91 of the Act of 1867, then the 
Dominion statute prevails over the provincial legislation and takes effect according to its 
tenor.219 
 
To support this conclusion Viscount Cave L.C. quoted Lord Herschell’s now well-worn 
passage from the Voluntary Assignments Case.220 According to Viscount Cave, “Lord 
                                                 
216 Royal Bank of Canada v Larue [1928] AC 187, 8 CBR 579 at para 2 (PC). 
217 Royal Bank of Canada v Larue, [1928] AC 187, 8 CBR 579 at para 6 (PC). 
218 Royal Bank of Canada v Larue, [1928] AC 187, 8 CBR 579 at para 12 (PC). 
219 Royal Bank of Canada v Larue, [1928] AC 187, 8 CBR 579 at para 13 (PC). 
220 Ontario (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney General) [1894] AC 189 (PC) at para 27, cited in Royal 
Bank of Canada v Larue, [1928] AC 187, 8 CBR 579 at para 11 (PC). 
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Herschell’s judgment shows clearly that such an execution [the judicial hypothec] may 
lawfully be postponed by the Dominion Act.”221 Looking back to the nineteenth century 
Viscount Cave effectively entrenched Lord Herschell’s once obiter statement as part of 
Canadian constitutional law. As a result the Privy Council upheld the trustee’s original 
decision to dismiss the Bank’s claim.  
The reaction to Larue in Quebec was not positive.222 Within weeks of the decision 
a Barrister of the Montreal Bar rose in the Quebec National Assembly demanding that 
Parliament amend the Bankruptcy Act to allow judicial hypothecs to be recognized in a 
bankruptcy.223 In 1928, the Revue du Droit published “Démolisseurs!” in which 
Alexandre Gérain-Lajoie, a Quebec lawyer, condemned Royal Bank v Larue as 
destructive to Quebec civil law:224  
This disastrous, literally inexplicable decision made one more, broader blow in the barrier of 
protection that surrounded our provincial law. It was already quite damaged. It falls, of course, 
into ruins and no longer offers any security: how could one place its trust in it?225 
 
However, for British constitutional scholar Arthur Berriedale Keith the outcome 
in Larue was much more acceptable and perhaps inevitable. Whether the Bankruptcy Act 
                                                 
221 Royal Bank of Canada v Larue, [1928] AC 187, 8 CBR 579 at para 12 (PC).  
222 “Hypothèque judiciaire” (1927-8) 6 R du D 380 (Privy Council had overturned dissenting judgment of 
Rinfret J in the Supreme Court of Canada as well as overturning judgments from the Quebec Court of 
Appeal and Quebec Superior Court). 
223 “Hypothèque judiciaire” (1927-8) 6 R du D 380 at 380-381 (reporting that Aléderic Blain raised the 
matter on February 22, 1928). 
224 Alexandre Gérin-Lajoie, “Démolisseurs! Pour ne pas dire pire” (1927-28) 6 R du D 449. Démolisseurs 
translates into demolishers or wreckers. 
225 Alexandre Gérin-Lajoie, “Démolisseurs! Pour ne pas dire pire” (1927-28) 6 R du D 449 at 464. Original 
French: “Cette décision néfaste, littéralement inexplicable, fait une brèche de plus, et large, dans la barrière 
de protection qui entourait notre droit provincial. Celle-ci était déjà assez endommageé pourtant. Elle 
tombe, évidemment, en ruines et n'offre plus aucune sécurité: comment pourrait-on y mettre sa confiance?” 
[translated by author]. 
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could interfere with provincial legislation “seems obviously in the affirmative.”226  The 
Privy Council had “already asserted...that the Dominion could deal with the effect of an 
execution on property under a Dominion bankruptcy law”227 in the Voluntary 
Assignments Case. That answer, however, was not obvious to many prior to 1928 and 
perhaps to some even after Larue.228 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 The absence of an established bankruptcy bar made it challenging for a legal 
community approaching a bankruptcy statute for the first time. But understanding and 
interpreting the new Act was only part of the problem. In 1919, Parliament was 
reasserting its jurisdiction in bankruptcy after nearly forty years of provincial regulation 
of debtor-creditor law. The abrupt change to federal law meant that the new legislation 
would come under attack for interfering with established provincial law. This set the 
stage for both political opposition and constitutional challenges to the new paradigm of 
federal bankruptcy law. The political debates reflected a belief that Parliament had not 
achieved an adequate balance between federal and provincial rights in the Bankruptcy 
Act. Rather than relying upon the new federal law, Saskatchewan and Alberta proceeded 
                                                 
226 Berriedale Keith, “Notes on Imperial Constitutional Law” (1928) 10 J Comp Legis & Int'l L (3rd) 293 at 
308. 
227 Berriedale Keith, “Notes on Imperial Constitutional Law” (1928) 10 J Comp Legis & Int'l L (3rd) 293 
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228 Perhaps Larue could never bridge the gap between these two views. In Quebec, the notion that federal 
bankruptcy law interfered with the Civil Code, continued well after 1928. See Rosalie Jukier & Roderick 
A. Macdonald, “The New Quebec Civil Code and Recent Federal Law Reform Proposals” (1992) 20 Can 
Bus LJ 380 at n 89 (Privy Council’s refusal to recognize judicial hypothec in Larue demonstrates that the  
federal Bankruptcy Act “has never been particularly sensitive to the intellectual structure of the civil law”); 
See Pierre Carignan, “La Competence Legislative en Matiere de Faillite et d’Insolvabilite” (1979) 57 Can 
Bar Rev 47 at 73 (recommending that the provinces should be given jurisdiction over personal 
bankruptcies).  
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to enact their own debtor relief legislation in response to the regional economic crisis in 
those two provinces. The demand for repeal by Québec National Assembly and some 
Québec MPs reflected a strong provincial rights perspective. The new Bankruptcy Act 
and the federal bankruptcy power threatened provincial law, which had been dominant 
over the preceding forty years. When constitutional litigation arose, early cases illustrated 
that there was not an overwhelming acceptance of a broad bankruptcy and insolvency 
power and the resolution of this constitutional question was not certain as the decade 
progressed.  
The Privy Council’s decision in Royal Bank v Larue ruled in favour of a broad 
bankruptcy power. Larue continued to have influence at the end of the decade.229 In 
1929, the Supreme Court of Canada230 cited Larue and quoted at length from the 
Voluntary Assignments Case.231 By 1932, the leading bankruptcy text, Bankruptcy in 
Canada, 2nd ed., by Lewis Duncan and W.J. Reilley, had inserted Larue into their 
chapter, “Bankruptcy and Insolvency under the Canadian Federal System” following 
                                                 
229 However, the question of the legal relationship between judgment creditors and bankruptcy did not 
disappear. The Supreme Court of Canada decision in 1959 revisited this issue in Canadian Credit Men's 
Trust Assn. v. Beaver Trucking Ltd, [1959] SCR 311. The enactment of modern judgment enforcement 
legislation in some provinces again raises the issue of the status of a registered judgment in a bankruptcy. 
See RCC Cuming, “Priority Competition between Secured and Unsecured Creditors: The Evolution of 
Policy” (2015) 30 BFLR 457. 
 
230 Canadian Men’s Trust Association v Hoffar Limited [1929] SCR 180, 10 CBR 374. See also R v Leach 
(1929), 11 CBR 214 (NSSC) (although the court did not cite Larue at para 12, the court adopted a broad 
conception of the bankruptcy power).  
 
231 Since 1929 Larue has become part of Canadian constitutional law. The Supreme Court of Canada in 
two judgments referred to Larue as a seminal case: Husky Oil Operations Ltd v Minister of National 
Revenue [1995] 3 SCR 453 at para 9; Deloitte, Haskins & Sells Ltd v Alberta (Workers' Compensation 
Board) [1985] 1 SCR 785 at para 28. It has also been cited by the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference 
re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada) [1934] SCR 659 at para 4; Re Gingras automobile 
Ltée [1962] SCR 676 at para 7; Canadian Credit Men's Trust Association v Beaver Trucking Ltd [1959] 
SCR 311 at para 22.  It has also featured in provincial appellate courts. See e.g. Toronto-Dominion Bank v 
Phillips, 2014 ONCA 613 at para 27; Re James, 2002 BCCA 179 at para 22; Re Sklar (1958), 26 WWR 
529, 15 DLR (2d) 750 (Sask CA) at para 7, 10-12. 
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their discussion of Cushing v Dupuy and the Voluntary Assignments Case. For the 
authors, there appeared to be a natural progression from the nineteenth century 
jurisprudence to Larue. Reading that text and its summary of leading appellate cases, one 
misses the doubt that surrounded the conflict between provincial rights and the federal 
bankruptcy power in the 1920s.232  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
232 The 1920s demonstrates that there will be an inevitable and ongoing clash between the bankruptcy 
power and provincial law. See Roderick Wood, “The Paramountcy Principle in Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Law: The Latest Word (2016) 58 CBLJ 27 discussing Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v Lemare Lake 
Logging Ltd, 2015 SCC 53, [2015] 3 SCR 419; Alberta (Attorney General) v Moloney, 2015 SCC 51, 
[2015] 3 SCR 327; 407 ETR Concession Co. v. Canada (Superintendent of Bankruptcy), 2015 SCC 52, 
[2015] 3 SCR 397. 
 
 
 
